➥【重點摘要】:
為什麼兒童與成人感染新冠病毒的疾病嚴重度迥異,作者針對兩種可能性做探討: 腎素-血管張力素系統(Renin angiotensin (RAS) system)的受體(receptors)差異及對病原體的發炎反應(inflammatory responses)改變。
新冠病毒(COVID-19)與嚴重急性呼吸道症候群的冠狀病毒(SARS-CoV)都是藉由血管張力素轉化酶2受體(angiotension-convereting enzyme (ACE)2 receptor)入侵宿主細胞並主要通過呼吸道傳播。
這些受體存在體內多種不同型態的細胞包含免疫細胞如單核球、嗜中性球和淋巴球等。RAS系統與發炎有關,藉由血管張力素II 和血管張力素轉化酶2改變RAS 活性,可使促炎症反應轉為消炎反應。
相關實證列舉如下: 在敗血症休克的動物模組可觀察血管張力素II第一型受體的抑制劑有部分緩解效果;在小鼠模組研究,血管張力素轉化酶2的濃度過高或過低都可能產生不正常的免疫反應和肺部發炎。
成人與兒童的發炎反應不同且隨著生命週期而變異。研究顯示年齡與急性呼吸窘迫症候群(acute respiratory distress syndrome,ARDS)的嚴重度有關,嗜中性球功能所涉及的促炎因子之增加也與年齡相關。
而在利用phytohemaggluttinin (PHA)刺激探討細胞激素生成(cytokine production)的個體發生學(Ontogeny)時,觀察到新生兒時期升高的IL-10在生命早期即轉變為IL-10 / Th1 / Th2 / Th17細胞激素的平衡。這有助於防止病原體的侵襲但改善細胞激素風暴(cytokine storm)。
嚴重新冠病毒感染的特徵在於大量的促炎反應或是細胞激素風暴導致ARDS和多器官功能障礙 (Multiorgan dysfunction)。因此建議對於重症病患進行是否過度發炎(hyperinflammation)的篩檢,藉由趨勢變化例如鐵蛋白(ferritin)增加、血小板減少或紅血球沉降率(erythrocyte sedimentation rate)下降,來辨識那些患者可能可使用抗炎治療以改善死亡率。
治療的選擇包括類固醇 (steroids)、靜脈注射免疫球蛋白(Intravenous immunoglobulin)、選擇性細胞激素的阻斷劑 (selective cytokine blockade) 如anakinra或tocilizumab、瑞德西韋(Remdesivir)、羥氯奎寧(hydroxychloroquine) 和JAK 抑制劑 (Janus kinase inhibition)。
Remdesivir (GS-5734)的結構為核苷酸類似物(nucleotide analog),作用在阻斷RNA依賴性聚合酶(RNA dependent RNA polymerase),是一種前驅藥物(prodrug,需於生物體內轉化才具有藥理作用),目前使用於治療伊波拉病毒(Ebola virus)感染的臨床試驗,具有廣泛抗RNA病毒的活性包括SARS-CoV和中東呼吸症候群冠狀病毒(Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus [MERS-CoV]。
氯奎寧(Chloroquine)可阻止病毒進入胞內體(Endosome)。在一個開放性(Open-label)、非隨機(non-randomized clinical trial)的臨床試驗,合併使用羥氯奎寧加抗黴漿菌藥物日舒(Azithromycin)帶來治療新冠病毒感染的曙光。系統性回顧亦顯示氯奎寧能抑制SARS-CoV-2在體外的複製。
中國正在進行一項臨床試驗,對於感染新冠病毒且IL-6升高的重症患者投予tocilizumab,目前的成果是正向的(ChiCTR2000029765)。Tocilizumab是一種抗IL-6受體之單株抗體,被核准用於巨細胞動脈炎(giant cell arteritis)和類風濕關節炎(rheumatoid arthritis),但對幼年型免疫性關節炎似乎無法單用阻斷IL-6去控制發炎反應。
類固醇可抑制發炎,但由於缺乏有效的證據及存在免疫抑制和次發性細菌或真菌感染的傷害風險,世界衛生組織目前的臨時指南並不建議使用。
敗血症可分為兩個階段,第一階段是強烈的初始促炎期和細胞激素風暴,接者是潛在的長期免疫抑制期,這個免疫抑制和調節異常是敗血症相關致死的主因。若在此階段進行抗炎治療可能是有害的。
個人化的免疫反應資訊將有助於啟動抗IL-6等治療,且全程監測促炎和抗炎反應是必要的。此外,敗血症的定義和反應在兒童及新生兒是不同的。兒童感染新冠病毒的預後較佳可能有多種原因,進一步了解在不同年齡層的免疫反應差異,對於標靶免疫治療 (targeted immunotherapies)是很有價值。
*關於羥氯奎寧、抗黴漿菌藥物日舒及瑞德西韋對新冠病毒感染的治療成效已陸續有新的成果發表,包含可能的副作用等。請參考更新的實證。(「財團法人國家衛生研究院」陳美惠醫師 摘要整理)
📋 CIVID-19 in Children and Altered Inflammatory Responses(2020/04/03)+中文摘要轉譯
➥Author:Eleanor J. Molloy and Cynthia F. Bearer
➥Link: Pediatric Research (Nature)
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41390-020-0881-y
#2019COVID19Academic
衛生福利部
疾病管制署 - 1922防疫達人
疾病管制署
國家衛生研究院-論壇
同時也有1部Youtube影片,追蹤數超過2萬的網紅立華,也在其Youtube影片中提到,============================ BTSU資料手套更正 根據遊戲的英文版本"只需要手動摧毀任何蜂窩"就可以發動資料手套的天賦 而不是遊戲的中文版本"手動摧毀強心或巧匠蜂窩"才能發動資料手套的天賦 但容許我抱怨一句,到底是什麼人才會把天賦翻譯成與原文不符..... ======...
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那個南方叫屏東
屏東的黑鮪魚好ㄘ(〃∀〃)
【2016,這就是台灣人想要的總統!】
「妳回北京以後,告訴他們,」蔡英文說:「台灣的下一任總統曾經為妳服務過。」
(“Go back to Beijing,” says Tsai, “and tell them you were served by the next President of Taiwan.”)
上面那段話,是這幾天來,最讓我感佩與震撼的一段話。那是蔡英文主席接受《TIME》雜誌專訪長文的結語,鏗鏘有力,也讓人無比動容...
2016,我希望我能有幸擁有這樣的總統,一股溫柔的力量,卻又充滿自信與霸氣,不慍不火、不卑不亢,而這正是台灣這個即將新生的島國,用來在世界永續立足,最需要的態度。
朋友們告訴我,昨天附上的《TIME》雜誌英漢對照翻譯文章,已經被下架了。對此,我真的感到非常遺憾。(更新消息:PTT貼文者並非原譯,因恐引起誤會而刪文。原譯文出自獨立記者Jessie Chen臉書,特此致謝。)
對於那篇連夜趕出的翻譯稿,也許不同立場的朋友,會有不同想法與批評。但對於譯者的熱心與用心,我只有發自內心的感激和敬佩。因此,我在網路上找到備份文章,再一次(無修改)分享給我的朋友們,需要的,就幫忙再傳播出去吧!
德不孤必有鄰,一位擅長漫畫的朋友,也默默傳了她關於那段「溫柔力量」談話的圖像詮釋。淡淡的畫風,彷彿原景重現,對我而言,那份感動,似乎又更深了一些...
有人以文字速譯向小英致敬、有人以圖像速寫向小英致敬──
而我,只能藉此臉書一角,向翻譯者、漫畫家,跟小英總統本人,獻上最誠心的祝福與感謝!
謝謝你們,讓台灣變成一個更好更美的地方。
──────────底下為英漢對照翻譯原文──────────
民進黨主席暨總統參選人蔡英文登上最新一期時代雜誌封面,標題是「她將可能領導華人世界唯一民主國家, She Could Lead The Only Chinese Democracy」。蔡主席是繼印度總理莫迪、印尼總統佐科威、韓國總統朴槿惠後,最新一位登上時代雜誌封面的亞洲領導人。
中英譯全文:
雜誌封面
She Could Lead the Only Chinese Democracy
And that makes Beijing nervous
她將可能領導華人世界唯一的民主國家
這讓北京感到緊張
目錄頁
Cover Story: Championing Taiwan
Presidential front runner Tsai Ing-wen wants to put the island’s interests first
封面故事:壯大台灣
總統大選領先者蔡英文要將台灣利益置於優先
內頁大標
‘The Next President Of Taiwan’
That’s how Tsai Ing-wen refers to herself. But will the island’s voters agree?
台灣的下一任總統
蔡英文是這樣認為。但是這座島嶼的選民會同意嗎?
內文
Emily Rauhala / 台北報導 Adam Ferguson / 攝影
Tsai Ing-wen is making breakfast. The presidential candidate cracks five eggs and lets them bubble with bacon in the pan. She stacks slices of thick, white toast. It’s a recipe adapted from British chef Jamie Oliver, but the ingredients, she can’t help but say, are pure Taiwan. The meat comes courtesy of Happy Pig, a farm near her spare but tasteful Taipei apartment, the bread from a neighborhood bakery. She offers me an orange. “Organic,” she says, in English. “And local, of course.”
蔡英文正在做早餐。這位總統候選人打了五個蛋,和著平底鍋裡面的培根一起吱吱作響,再把一片片白色的厚片土司疊起來。料理手法學自英國名廚傑米奧利佛(Jamie Oliver),但是她忍不住要說,烹調食材屬於最純粹的台灣原料。培根來自「快樂豬」農場,距離她那簡單卻有品味的公寓不遠,而麵包是從她家附近的烘培坊買來的。她遞了一顆橘子給我,用英文跟我說:「有機的!當然也是在地的。」
This is not an average breakfast for the 58-year-old lawyer turned politician running to become Taiwan’s next President—most days she grabs a coffee and books it to the car. But it is, in many ways, oh so Tsai. The Taipei-raised, U.S.- and U.K.-educated former negotiator wrote her doctoral thesis on international trade law. As a minister, party chair and presidential candidate (she narrowly lost to two-term incumbent Ma Ying-jeou in the 2012 race), Tsai gained a reputation for being wonky—the type who likes to debate protectionism over early-morning sips of black coffee or oolong tea.
對於這位58歲、從律師轉變成政治人物的總統候選人來說,這可不是她平常吃的早餐。她通常隨手抓一杯咖啡在車上喝。不過許多方面來說,這應該可以算是一貫的「蔡式」風格。這位在臺北長大、在英美留學過的談判專家,博士論文寫的是國際貿易法。在她當陸委 會主委、民進黨主席、總統候選人期間(她在2012年的總統大選中以些微差距輸給了馬英九總統),得到學院派的風評──她是那種喜歡在早上喝黑咖啡或烏龍茶時,跟你辯論保護主義的人。
Now, as the early front runner in Taiwan’s January 2016 presidential election, her vision for the island is proudly, defiantly, Taiwan-centric. Tsai says she would maintain the political status quo across the strait with China—essentially, both Taipei and Beijing agreeing to disagree as to which represents the one, true China, leaving the question of the island’s fate to the future. But Tsai wants to put Taiwan’s economy, development and culture first. While Ma and his government have pushed for new trade and tourism pacts with Beijing—China accounts for some 40% of Taiwan’s exports—Tsai aims to lessen the island’s dependence on the mainland by building global ties and championing local brands. “Taiwan needs a new model, ” she tells TIME.
現在,身為在2016年台灣總統大選中的領先者,蔡英文的願景充滿自信又堅定地強調以台灣為核心。蔡英文說她會維持兩岸的現狀──這指的是說臺北與北京彼此同意對於何者代表中國保留不同的認知(註明:這是時代雜誌記者的見解),並且把這個島嶼的命運留給未來決定。但,蔡英文想要將台灣的經濟、發展與文化置於首位。當馬英九和他的政府推動與中國的貿易及觀光協議時(中國占台灣出口的百分之四十),蔡英文希望加強與世界連結、扶植台灣品牌,以降低台灣對中國的依賴。她對時代雜誌說:「台灣需要一個新模式」。
Whether voters share her vision is a question that matters beyond Taipei. Taiwan is tiny, with a population of only 23 million, but its economy—powered by electronics, agriculture and tourism—ranks about mid-20s in the world by GDP size, with a GDP per capita about thrice that of China’s. Ceded by China’s Qing dynasty to Japan after the 1894–95 First Sino-Japanese War, colonized by Tokyo for half a century, then seized by Nationalist forces fleeing the Communists at the end of the Chinese civil war, Taiwan has long been a pawn in a regional great game. It is a linchpin for the U.S. in East Asia alongside Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, and, most important, it’s the only real democracy in the Chinese-speaking world.
“This election matters because it’s a window into democracy rooted in Chinese tradition,” says Lung Ying-tai, an author and social commentator who recently stepped down as Culture Minister. “Because of Taiwan, the world is able to envision a different China.”
台灣的選民是否同意她的願景,是一件擴及台北以外的事情。台灣的土地雖小,只有兩千三百萬的人口,但是經濟因電子業,農業以及觀光業的支,以國內生產毛額來說在世界排名第二十幾名。台灣的國內人均產值則是中國的三倍。台灣在1894-95的中日戰爭被中國清朝割讓後,被日本殖民了半個世紀;之後在中國內戰結束時逃避共產黨的國民黨勢力給佔領。長期以來台灣是區域競爭中的一個棋子。在美國的東亞布局中,台灣、日本、南韓及菲律賓同為最關鍵的環節。更重要的是,台灣是在華語世界中唯一一個真正的民主國家。甫卸任文化部長的作者與社會評論員龍應台表示:「這場選舉很重要,因為它提供了一個窗口,讓外界一探以中華文化為根基的民主……因為台灣,世界得以想像一個不一樣的中國。」
Taiwan’s politics irritate and befuddle Beijing. To the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Taiwan is the province that got away, a living, breathing, voting reminder of what could happen to China if the CCP loosens its grip on its periphery, from Tibet to Xinjiang to Hong Kong. Beijing is particularly wary of a change in government from Ma’s relatively China-friendly Kuomintang (KMT) to Tsai’s firmly China-skeptic Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). When Tsai ran for President in 2012, Beijing blasted her, without actually naming her, as a “troublemaker” and “splittist”—CCP-speak reserved for Dalai Lama–level foes. “A DPP government means uncertainty for cross-strait ties,” says Lin Gang, a Taiwan specialist at Shanghai Jiao Tong University’s School of International and Public Affairs.
台灣的政治讓北京感到惱怒又百思不解。對中國共產黨來說,台灣是一個逃走的省,也是對中國活生生的提醒──若中國鬆懈對於香港、西藏及新疆等非核心地區的掌控時,可能會發生的事。北京對於台灣的政權,由對中國相對友善的馬政府輪替到對中國保持疑慮的民進黨,抱持格外戒慎的態度。蔡英文在2012年參選總統的時候,北京雖然沒有指名道姓,卻明顯對她大肆抨擊,說她是一個「麻煩製造者」或「分裂主義者」——在共產黨的術語中,這些話專門達賴喇嘛這一層級的仇敵。任教於上海交通大學國際與公共關係學院的台灣事務專家林岡說:「民進黨政府代表的是兩岸關係的不確定性。」
To the U.S., which is bound by the Taiwan Relations Act to come to the island’ s aid if it’s attacked, Taiwan is a longtime friend and unofficial ally, though the strength of that friendship is being tested by China’s rise. Washington worries that Taiwan’s people, especially its youth, are growing warier of China, and that any conflict between the two might draw in the U.S.
“What this election has done is crystallize the changes, the shift in public opinion,” says Shelley Rigger, a Taiwan scholar at Davidson College in North Carolina and the author of Why Taiwan Matters. “I don’t think cross-strait relations are going to be easy going forward, and that’s not something U.S. policymakers want to hear.”
對美國來說,根據《台灣關係法》,在台灣受到武力攻擊的情況下,須協防台灣。台灣是美國長期友邦和非正式盟國,儘管兩國之間友誼的強度正受到中國崛起的考驗。華府擔心台灣人民,特別是年輕人,對於中國的警戒心逐漸提高,而兩者之間的衝突可能會把美國牽扯進來。著有《台灣為何重要》(Why Taiwan Matters)一書的美國北卡羅來那州戴維森大學(Davidson College)教授任雪麗(Shelley Rigger)說:「這場選舉讓所有的改變具體化,反映出民意板塊的移動……我不認為接下來的兩岸關係會更融洽,而這不是美國的政策制定者想要聽到的東西。」
The KMT has yet to formally nominate a candidate for the top job, but the favorite is Hung Hsiu-chu, the legislature’s female deputy speaker. Nicknamed ”little hot pepper” because of her diminutive stature and feisty manner, Hung, 67, would be a contrast to the more professorial Tsai should she get the KMT’s nod. “I don’t think [Tsai] is a strong opponent,” Hung tells TIME. Yet the DPP’s choice, who has already started pressing the flesh islandwide, is spirited too. “People have this vision of me as a conservative person, but I’m actually quite adventurous,” she says. And possessed of a sharp sense of humor—when I compliment her cooking, Tsai looks at me with mock exasperation: “I have a Ph.D., you know.”
國民黨雖然還未正式提名總統候選人,但目前最被看好的就是立法院副院長洪秀柱。因為身材嬌小與好戰性格而被封為「小辣椒」的洪秀柱(67歲),如果獲黨的提名,將與擁有學者形象的蔡英文,呈現顯著的對比。洪秀柱向時代記者表示:「我不認為蔡英文是一位強的對手」。然而,民進黨的候選人已經士氣高昂,在全台各地展開競選活動。蔡英文說:「有些人認為我是一個保守的人,但我其實是很愛冒險的」。她有一種犀利的幽默感──當我讚美她的廚藝時,她用搞笑的語氣假裝惱怒說:「我可是擁有博士學位的。」
Tsai grew up in a home on Taipei’s Zhongshan Road North, a street named after Taiwan’s symbolic father, Sun Yat-sen, the Chinese revolutionary who helped overthrow the Qing and co-founded the KMT. Her own father, an auto mechanic turned property developer, was of the Confucian kind: he encouraged her to study hard but also expected her, as the youngest daughter, to devote herself to his care. “I was not considered a kid that would be successful in my career,” says Tsai.
蔡英文在台北的中山北路長大,這條街是以革命推翻清朝、成立國民黨並視為國父的孫逸仙命名。她的父親是一位修車技師,後來成為土地開發商。他承襲了儒家思想,希望蔡英文要用功讀書,但也期許身為小女兒的蔡英文可以留在父親身邊照顧他。蔡英文說:「我小時候不是一個被認為未來會有成就的孩子。」
After attending university in Taiwan, she studied law at Cornell in New York because, she says, it seemed the place for a young woman who “wanted to have a revolutionary life.” From there she went to the London School of Economics, where she earned her Ph.D., also in law, in less than three years. “That pleased my father,” she says. When he called her home, she obliged, returning to Taiwan to teach and, in 1994, to enter government in a series of high- profile but mostly policy-oriented roles in the Fair Trade Commission, National Security Council and Mainland Affairs Council.
在台灣大學畢業後,她前往紐約州康乃爾大學研讀法律,因為她說,這是一個「想過革命性的生活」的年輕女子該去的地方。之後,她前往倫敦政治經濟學院攻讀法學博士,並且三年不到就獲得學位。她說:「這讓我父親很高興」。她遵從父親的意思返回台灣,先回大學教書並在1994年進入政府,出任公平交易委員會、國安會及陸委會等一系列重要的、政策導向的職位。
Even close supporters say Tsai was, and perhaps still is, an unlikely politician, especially for the DPP. Taiwan’s opposition party was forged in struggle and led by veterans of the democracy movement—a fight Tsai mostly missed. The Kaohsiung Incident in 1979—a human-rights rally that was violently broken up by security forces, galvanizing the democracy movement— took place while Tsai was overseas, cocooned in the ivory tower. If the archetypal DPP operative is a bare-knuckle street fighter, Tsai is an Olympic fencer—restrained and precise.
就連許多親近蔡英文的支持者都認為,蔡英文是一位非典型的政治人物,特別就民進黨而言。身為在野黨的民進黨,在台灣民主運動的奮鬥過程中焠煉而成,由民主運動的老兵所成立,這是一場蔡英文錯過的戰役。1979年高雄的美麗島事件,當一場人權遊行遭警政單位暴力驅散,而後來激勵了台灣的民主運動,蔡英文當時正在國外求學,受到象牙塔的庇護。若說民進黨的典型人物是赤手空拳的街頭鬥士,蔡英文則是一位奧林匹克級的劍術家:自我克制又精確到位。
She stepped into the spotlight in 2008, becoming party chair when the DPP found itself booted from office, with its chief Chen Shui-bian, the outgoing President, later convicted of corruption. While she possessed a deep knowledge of policy, Tsai did not then seem like a leader. “She used to sort of hide behind me when we went door to door,” recalls legislator Hsiao Bi-khim, a longtime colleague and friend. “People compared her to a lost bunny in the forest, with wolves surrounding, both from within the party and outside.
在2008年民進黨失去政權,而前總統陳水扁隨即遭貪汙罪起訴的時刻,蔡英文踏入了鎂光燈下,成為民進黨主席。雖然蔡英文對於政策擁有深度的瞭解,但當時她還不像一位領導人。長期以來是她同事與朋友的立法委員蕭美琴說「以前當我們挨家挨戶去拜訪時,她有點會躲在我身後」。「有些形容她為一個在森林裡迷路的兔子,被黨內與黨外的狼群包圍。」
After an unsuccessful 2010 mayoral bid, Tsai ran for, and also lost, the presidency in 2012. Jason Liu, a veteran DPP speechwriter, says now that the campaign did not “sell” Tsai well enough. The ideas were strong, but the delivery left “distance between her and the voters.” Ironically, it was not until her concession speech that Tsai seemed to connect emotionally with Taiwan’s citizens. “You may cry,” she told the tearful crowd. “But don’t lose heart.”
2010年,蔡英文參與市長選舉失利,在2012年也沒順利當選總統。民進黨資深文膽劉建忻表示,當時的競選總部對於「行銷」蔡英文這個概念,做得不夠好;雖然擁有許多好點子,但是執行上還是「讓選民感到有所距離」。諷刺地,一直到敗選感言,蔡英文才似乎與台灣人民產生情感上的連結。她對含著淚水的群眾表示:「你可以哭泣,但不能洩氣。」
A lot has changed since 2012. Eleven hours after making eggs, with a policy meeting, a cross-country train ride and a harbor tour behind her, Tsai is addressing a couple hundred students at a university in the southern city of Kaohsiung, a DPP stronghold. She’s in lecture mode, at ease, talking about her party’s economic plans: stronger regional links and a focus on innovation to support small businesses. “How many of you went to Taipei for the Sunflower protests?” she asks in Mandarin. At least a third raise their hands.
2012年之後的台灣,歷經了許多改變。蔡英文煎蛋後的11個小時後,歷經了一場政策會議、搭乘高鐵從北一路向南、緊接著進行高雄碼頭導覽。她抵達南台灣民進黨的重鎮高雄,向數百位大學生發表演說。她以一派輕鬆的授課模式,闡述著民進黨的經濟計畫:加強區域間的連結,並聚焦於支持創新的小型經濟。她用中文詢問在場學生「你們之中有多少人去台北參加過太陽花學運?」現場至少有三分之一的學生舉起了手。
Taiwan’s students were once seen as apathetic. But during spring last year, Taipei was swept up by thousands-strong demonstrations over a services pact with China. Student and civic groups worried that the deal could hurt Taiwan’s economy and leave it vulnerable to pressure from Beijing. They felt it was pushed through without adequate public scrutiny. The Sunflower Movement, as it came to be called after a florist donated bundles of the blooms, grew into a grassroots revolt, culminating in the March 18 storming of the legislature.
台灣的學生過去一度被視為相當冷漠。但是在去年的春天,台北市被數以千計的抗議者淹沒,反對與中國簽訂的服務貿易協議。學生與公民團體擔憂這個協議會傷害台灣經濟,讓台灣的經濟受制於中國壓力而變得脆弱。他們也認為,服貿協議的推動並沒有經過適當的公民審議。太陽花運動是民間累積的抗爭與不滿,在3月18日這天一舉衝進立法院,運動的稱號是由於抗爭期間一位花販捐贈了大量太陽花而因此命名。
The movement was grounded in questions of social justice. Since coming to power in 2008, Ma has argued that cross-strait commerce is the key to the island’s fortunes, signing 21 trade deals. Yet young people in particular wonder if the deals benefit only Big Business on both sides of the strait. They say rapprochement with Beijing has left them none the richer, and agonize over the high cost of housing, flat wages and the possibility of local jobs going to China. A sign during a protest outside the Presidential Palace on March 30 last year captured the mood: “We don’t have another Taiwan to sell.”
這個運動的主要訴求就是社會正義。自從國民黨2008年執政以來,簽訂了21個兩岸貿易協定,馬英九主張兩岸的商業往來是台灣最關鍵的財富來源。但是年輕人質疑這項論述,他們認為這些貿易協議只有兩岸的大財團獲利。他們說北京的和解政策並沒有讓年輕人變得富有,反而讓他們受困於高房價、停滯的薪資、以及在地工作機會可能流失到中國的可能性。在去年3月30日於總統府外的抗議中,有個標語最能捕捉整體的社會氛圍:「台灣只有一個,賣了就沒了!」
The emphasis on quality of life, and not just macro-indicators, is good news for Tsai. Her vision for a more economically independent Taiwan did not sway the electorate in 2012 but may now have stronger appeal. The KMT, bruised by the Sunflower protests and then battered by fed-up voters in midterm polls last fall, is trying to remake itself as a more populist party. Timothy Yang, a former Foreign Minister who is now vice president of the National Policy Foundation, the KMT’s think tank, says the party stands by its cross-strait record. But even Yang, a KMT stalwart, is keen to address the issue of equity:
“The benefits of this interaction with mainland China should be shared with the general public.”
台灣社會對於生活品質的重視,而非僅僅強調宏觀經濟指標,對蔡英文來說是件好事。她希望打造一個經濟上更加獨立的台灣,雖然這個理念在2012年並沒有說動選民,但,現在可能更有吸引力。國民黨在太陽花運動中受到重創,在去年秋天的期中選舉中又再度被選民以選票教訓。現在,國民黨試圖把自己再造成一個民粹的政黨。目前擔任國民黨智庫『國家政策基金會』副董事長的前外交部長楊進添先生受訪時說道,「國民黨堅持其兩岸的立場」。但即便像楊進添這樣堅定的國民黨員,也熱衷於解決公平的議題。他說:「兩岸互動的利益,應該要與全民共享!」
Tsai should easily carry traditional DPP support: much of the south, the youth vote, and those who identify as Taiwanese and who are not a part of the elite that came from China after the CCP victory in 1949. The DPP’s missing link is Big Business, which supports the KMT and closer ties with the mainland, where many Taiwan companies are invested. Tsai recognizes that this is a constituency she needs to woo but doesn’t seem clear as to how, beyond saying, “Our challenge is to produce something that is sensible to both sides without being considered as a traitor to the friends we used to be with when we were an opposition party.”
蔡英文要得到傳統民進黨的支持並不難,例如南部選民、年輕選票、還有那些認同自己是台灣人,而不是1949年中國共產黨勝利後來自中國的精英份子。然而,民進黨缺乏與大企業的連結,因為台灣企業大量投資大陸,而其中這些大財團多半支持國民黨,以及與大陸建立更緊密的關係。蔡英文也理解到這是她必須要去吸引的一群選民,但是對於如何進行並沒有太清楚的圖像。她說:「我們的挑戰是要去創造雙方都認為合理的立場,又不能被我們在野時的朋友認為是叛徒。」
That will be hard. The KMT has long argued that it, not the DPP, is best qualified to run the economy, which, corruption apart, did not do well under Chen. Tsai’s supporters concede that many citizens feel the same way—that the DPP can be an effective opposition but not administration. “The KMT has always portrayed itself as more suited to guide the economy,” says J. Michael Cole, a Taipei-based senior fellow with the University of Nottingham’s China Policy Institute and a senior officer at Tsai’s Thinking Taiwan Foundation. “There’s this stubborn perception that a DPP government would be bad for business.”
這是困難的挑戰。國民黨長期主張自己比民進黨更擅長治理經濟,尤其陳水扁執政時期除了貪污,經濟表現並不好。蔡英文的支持者也同意,確實有些民眾認為民進黨可是一個稱職的反對黨,但不是執政黨。諾丁漢大學中國政策研究中心資深研究員暨小英基金會資深主管寇謐將(J. Michael Cole)說:「國民黨把自己描繪是一個更適合主導經濟的政黨。另外也有一種僵化的刻版印象,認為民進黨執政對企業不利。」
It’s a narrative that the CCP backs and may well float as the campaign progresses, either directly, in China’s state-controlled press, or indirectly, through, for instance, its connections in Taiwan’s business community. “Beijing is going to want to make a point through all sorts of channels, including Big Business, that cross-strait relations will not be as smooth if you vote a government into power that has not accepted the foundation that has underpinned developments of the last eight years,” says Alan Romberg, a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center, a Washington, D.C., think tank.
這種論調受到中國共產黨的支持,並且今隨著選戰的進展不斷被拋出。共產黨可能直接地利用中國控制的媒體影響選舉,或是間接地透過中國與台灣商業界的連結。美國華府智庫史汀森研究中心(Stimson Center)資深學者容安瀾(Alan Romberg)說:「北京將會透過大企業等各種管道來闡述其立場,表明要是台灣人民讓一個不接受過去八年兩岸發展基
礎的政府執政,兩岸關係的發展將不會如現在一樣平順。」
Beijing has never been receptive to a DPP government, but it is particularly negative now. Since coming to power in 2012, China’s leader Xi Jinping has proved himself to be more assertive and nationalistic than most expected, a man not eager to compromise. Last September he told a delegation from the island that China and Taiwan might be one day be reunited under Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” formula, which is rejected by both the KMT and DPP and, surveys consistently show, the vast majority of Taiwan’s people. This May, Xi warned again about the danger of “separatist forces”—a comment widely interpreted as a swipe at the DPP.
北京對於民進黨政權的接受度向來不高,但現在尤其抱持負面的態度。中國領導人習近平在2012年掌權後,證明自己比外界想像的還更加武斷,帶有更強烈的民族主義色彩,是一個不輕易妥協的人。去年九月,他對一個來自台灣的代表團說,中國和台灣可望採用香港「一國兩制」的模式統一,然而這卻是一個國民黨和民進黨都反對的方案,而且民調也一再顯示,絕大多數的台灣人民無法接受。今年五月,習近平再度警告「分裂主義勢力」會帶來的危險──這段說詞普遍被外界詮釋為對民進黨的抨擊。
Cross-strait relations are managed according to the so-called 1992 Consensus reached by Beijing and Taipei (then also governed by the KMT), a formula the KMT’s Yang calls “a masterpiece of ambiguity.” Under the 1992 Consensus, both sides acknowledge that there is only one China, but without specifying what exactly that means. This, Yang says, has allowed the KMT to move forward on bilateral trade, transport and tourism without being forced to address whether “one China” is the China imagined by Beijing or by Taipei.
兩岸關係是治理目前根據北京和台北(當時為國民黨執政)之間所謂的九二共識,這是一個被國民黨的楊進添形容為「模糊性的一大鉅作」的政策。根據九二共識,雙方承認只有一個中國,但不表明一個中國的確切意含。楊進添說,這讓國民黨在推展雙邊貿易、交通和觀光方面得以取得進展,而不需被迫去回答「一個中國」究竟是北京或是台北心目中的中國。
The DPP has long promoted de jure independence. The first clause in its charter calls for “the establishment of an independent sovereignty known as the Republic of Taiwan,” not the Republic of China, Taiwan’s official name. This platform resonates with the DPP base but is increasingly untenable given China’s economic clout and growing power on the world stage. While the first DPP presidency under Chen was hardly a break from the past, it did see a cooling with Beijing. Things warmed again under Ma. Lin, the Taiwan expert at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, says Tsai is somewhere between Chen and Ma: “If she wins the election, she will not pursue Taiwan in dependence. But she will not promote the development of the cross-strait relationship as Ma Ying-jeou did.”
民進黨過去長期以來推動台灣的法理獨立。民進黨黨綱第一條闡明「建立主權獨立自主的台灣共和國」,而非台灣的正式國號中華民國。這個立場獲得民進黨基本盤的認同,卻在中國的經濟實力成長與中國在世界舞台上崛起之下,越來越無法實現。儘管陳水扁主政時期的民進黨政府跟過去的政策並無太大差別,但跟北京的關係確實趨向冷淡。馬英九主政時期兩岸關係再度暖化。上海交通大學的台灣專家林岡說,蔡英文的立場介於馬英九和陳水扁之間。他說:「如果她勝選,她不會追求台灣獨立。但她也不會像馬英九一樣推動兩岸關係的發展。」
Tsai stresses that she will not alter the politics between Taiwan and China, but she is vague about whether she will repeal the DPP’s independence clause. And unification? That, she says, “is something you have to resolve democratically—it is a decision to be made by the people here.”
蔡英文強調她不會改變台灣和中國之間的政治關係,但對於是否撤回台獨條文卻是依然維持模糊。至於統一呢?她說:「那是必須經由民主程序解決的事情——這是一個必須經由此地的人民來做的決定。」
Hung, Tsai’s potential KMT opponent, says the DPP flag bearer needs to clarify her stance on cross-strait relations. “People ask her, ‘What is the status quo?’ and she can’t say anything specific,” says Hung. The KMT’s Yang offers a metaphor: “Before you harvest, you have to plow the land, transplant the seedlings, fertilize; all the work … has been done by the KMT, and yet they are going to harvest the crop?”
蔡英文的在對手洪秀柱說,民進黨的掌舵手需要清楚地闡明她對兩岸關係的立場。洪秀柱說:「大家問她『維持現狀是什麼意思?』,她卻沒有給具體的回應。」國民黨的楊進添用一個比喻:「在收割之前,要先耕地、播種、施肥;所有的工作……都已經被國民黨完成了,然而他們現在卻想要收割?」
Tsai believes she will win that right. Several days before I return to my Beijing base, over Taiwan-Japanese fusion in Kaohsiung, Tsai is quietly confident that she will gain the trust of Taiwan’s voters and secure victory, whatever Beijing might think. She puts a final piece of tuna on my plate. It’ s from Pingtung County in the south, where she was born. “Go back to Beijing,” says Tsai, “and tell them you were served by the next President of Taiwan.”
蔡英文相信她會贏得這項權利。在我返回北京駐點的前幾天,我們在一家位於高雄的台式日本料理小店用餐,蔡英文對於取得台灣選民的信任並贏得選戰,展現出低調的自信。當時,她把最後一片鮪魚夾到我的盤子上。那塊鮪魚來自南方的屏東,她的出生地。「妳回北京以後,告訴他們,」蔡英文說:「台灣的下一任總統曾經為妳服務過。」
—With reporting by Zoher Abdoolcarim, Gladys Tsai and Natalie Tso/Taipei
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圖片:猜猜看,認出畫風了嗎?^^
(歡迎任何形式分享,一律免問)
bearer中文 在 杜文卿 Facebook 的最佳解答
「她將可能領導華人世界唯一民主國家, She Could Lead The Only Chinese Democracy」。
民進黨主席暨總統參選人蔡英文登上最新一期時代雜誌封面,蔡主席是繼印度總理莫迪、印尼總統佐科威、韓國總統朴槿惠後,最新一位登上時代雜誌封面的亞洲領導人。
中英譯全文:
[雜誌封面]
She Could Lead the Only Chinese Democracy
And that makes Beijing nervous
她將可能領導華人世界唯一的民主國家
這讓北京感到緊張
[目錄頁]
Cover Story: Championing Taiwan
Presidential front runner Tsai Ing-wen wants to put the island’s interests first
封面故事:壯大台灣
總統大選領先者蔡英文要將台灣利益置於優先
[內頁大標]
‘The Next President Of Taiwan’
That’s how Tsai Ing-wen refers to herself. But will the island’s voters agree?
台灣的下一任總統
蔡英文是這樣認為。但是這座島嶼的選民會同意嗎?
[內文]
Emily Rauhala / 台北報導 Adam Ferguson / 攝影
Tsai Ing-wen is making breakfast. The presidential candidate cracks five eggs and lets them bubble with bacon in the pan. She stacks slices of thick, white toast. It’s a recipe adapted from British chef Jamie Oliver, but the ingredients, she can’t help but say, are pure Taiwan. The meat comes courtesy of Happy Pig, a farm near her spare but tasteful Taipei apartment, the bread from a neighborhood bakery. She offers me an orange. “Organic,” she says, in English. “And local, of course.”
蔡英文正在做早餐。這位總統候選人打了五個蛋,和著平底鍋裡面的培根一起吱吱作響,再把一片片白色的厚片土司疊起來。料理手法學自英國名廚傑米奧利佛(Jamie Oliver),但是她忍不住要說,烹調食材屬於最純粹的台灣原料。培根來自「快樂豬」農場,距離她那簡單卻有品味的公寓不遠,而麵包是從她家附近的烘培坊買來的。她遞了一顆橘子給我,用英文跟我說:「有機的!當然也是在地的。」
This is not an average breakfast for the 58-year-old lawyer turned politician running to become Taiwan’s next President—most days she grabs a coffee and books it to the car. But it is, in many ways, oh so Tsai. The Taipei-raised, U.S.- and U.K.-educated former negotiator wrote her doctoral thesis on international trade law. As a minister, party chair and presidential candidate (she narrowly lost to two-term incumbent Ma Ying-jeou in the 2012 race), Tsai gained a reputation for being wonky—the type who likes to debate protectionism over early-morning sips of black coffee or oolong tea.
對於這位58歲、從律師轉變成政治人物的總統候選人來說,這可不是她平常吃的早餐。她通常隨手抓一杯咖啡在車上喝。不過許多方面來說,這應該可以算是一貫的「蔡式」風格。這位在臺北長大、在英美留學過的談判專家,博士論文寫的是國際貿易法。在她當陸委會主委、民進黨主席、總統候選人期間(她在2012年的總統大選中以些微差距輸給了馬英九總統),得到學院派的風評──她是那種喜歡在早上喝黑咖啡或烏龍茶時,跟你辯論保護主義的人。
Now, as the early front runner in Taiwan’s January 2016 presidential election, her vision for the island is proudly, defiantly, Taiwan-centric. Tsai says she would maintain the political status quo across the strait with China—essentially, both Taipei and Beijing agreeing to disagree as to which represents the one, true China, leaving the question of the island’s fate to the future. But Tsai wants to put Taiwan’s economy, development and culture first. While Ma and his government have pushed for new trade and tourism pacts with Beijing—China accounts for some 40% of Taiwan’s exports—Tsai aims to lessen the island’s dependence on the mainland by building global ties and championing local brands. “Taiwan needs a new model,” she tells TIME.
現在,身為在2016年台灣總統大選中的領先者,蔡英文的願景充滿自信又堅定地強調以台灣為核心。蔡英文說她會維持兩岸的現狀──這指的是說臺北與北京彼此同意對於何者代表中國保留不同的認知[註明:這是時代雜誌記者的見解],並且把這個島嶼的命運留給未來決定。但,蔡英文想要將台灣的經濟、發展與文化置於首位。當馬英九和他的政府推動與中國的貿易及觀光協議時(中國占台灣出口的百分之四十),蔡英文希望加強與世界連結、扶植台灣品牌,以降低台灣對中國的依賴。她對時代雜誌說:「台灣需要一個新模式」。
Whether voters share her vision is a question that matters beyond Taipei. Taiwan is tiny, with a population of only 23 million, but its economy—powered by electronics, agriculture and tourism—ranks about mid-20s in the world by GDP size, with a GDP per capita about thrice that of China’s. Ceded by China’s Qing dynasty to Japan after the 1894–95 First Sino-Japanese War, colonized by Tokyo for half a century, then seized by Nationalist forces fleeing the Communists at the end of the Chinese civil war, Taiwan has long been a pawn in a regional great game. It is a linchpin for the U.S. in East Asia alongside Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, and, most important, it’s the only real democracy in the Chinese-speaking world. “This election matters because it’s a window into democracy rooted in Chinese tradition,” says Lung Ying-tai, an author and social commentator who recently stepped down as Culture Minister. “Because of Taiwan, the world is able to envision a different China.”
台灣的選民是否同意她的願景,是一件擴及台北以外的事情。台灣的土地雖小,只有兩千三百萬的人口,但是經濟因電子業,農業以及觀光業的支撐,以國內生產毛額來說在世界排名第二十幾名。台灣的國內人均產值則是中國的三倍。台灣在1894-95的中日戰爭被中國清朝割讓後,被日本殖民了半個世紀;之後在中國內戰結束時逃避共產黨的國民黨勢力給佔領。長期以來台灣是區域競爭中的一個棋子。在美國的東亞布局中,台灣、日本、南韓及菲律賓同為最關鍵的環節。更重要的是,台灣是在華語世界中唯一一個真正的民主國家。甫卸任文化部長的作者與社會評論員龍應台說:「這場選舉很重要,因為它提供了一個窗口,讓外界一探以中華文化為根基的民主……因為台灣,世界得以想像一個不一樣的中國。」
Taiwan’s politics irritate and befuddle Beijing. To the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Taiwan is the province that got away, a living, breathing, voting reminder of what could happen to China if the CCP loosens its grip on its periphery, from Tibet to Xinjiang to Hong Kong. Beijing is particularly wary of a change in government from Ma’s relatively China-friendly Kuomintang (KMT) to Tsai’s firmly China-skeptic Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). When Tsai ran for President in 2012, Beijing blasted her, without actually naming her, as a “troublemaker” and “splittist”—CCP-speak reserved for Dalai Lama–level foes. “A DPP government means uncertainty for cross-strait ties,” says Lin Gang, a Taiwan specialist at Shanghai Jiao Tong University’s School of International and Public Affairs.
台灣的政治讓北京感到惱怒又百思不解。對中國共產黨來說,台灣是一個逃走的省,也是對中國活生生的提醒──若中國鬆懈對於香港、西藏及新疆等非核心地區的掌控時,可能會發生的事。北京對於台灣的政權,由對中國相對友善的馬政府輪替到對中國保持疑慮的民進黨,抱持格外戒慎的態度。蔡英文在2012年參選總統的時候,北京雖然沒有指名道姓,卻明顯對她大肆抨擊,說她是一個「麻煩製造者」或「分裂主義者」——在共產黨的術語中,這些話專門達賴喇嘛這一層級的仇敵。任教於上海交通大學國際與公共關係學院的台灣事務專家林岡說:「民進黨政府代表的是兩岸關係的不確定性。」
To the U.S., which is bound by the Taiwan Relations Act to come to the island’s aid if it’s attacked, Taiwan is a longtime friend and unofficial ally, though the strength of that friendship is being tested by China’s rise. Washington worries that Taiwan’s people, especially its youth, are growing warier of China, and that any conflict between the two might draw in the U.S. “What this election has done is crystallize the changes, the shift in public opinion,” says Shelley Rigger, a Taiwan scholar at Davidson College in North Carolina and the author of Why Taiwan Matters. “I don’t think cross-strait relations are going to be easy going forward, and that’s not something U.S. policymakers want to hear.”
對美國來說,根據《台灣關係法》,在台灣受到武力攻擊的情況下,須協防台灣。台灣是美國長期友邦和非正式盟國,儘管兩國之間友誼的強度正受到中國崛起的考驗。華府擔心台灣人民,特別是年輕人,對於中國的警戒心逐漸提高,而兩者之間的衝突可能會把美國牽扯進來。著有《台灣為何重要》(Why Taiwan Matters)一書的美國北卡羅來那州戴維森大學(Davidson College)教授任雪麗(Shelley Rigger)說:「這場選舉讓所有的改變具體化,反映出民意板塊的移動……我不認為接下來的兩岸關係會更融洽,而這不是美國的政策制定者想要聽到的東西。」
The KMT has yet to formally nominate a candidate for the top job, but the favorite is Hung Hsiu-chu, the legislature’s female deputy speaker. Nicknamed “little hot pepper” because of her diminutive stature and feisty manner, Hung, 67, would be a contrast to the more professorial Tsai should she get the KMT’s nod. “I don’t think [Tsai] is a strong opponent,” Hung tells TIME. Yet the DPP’s choice, who has already started pressing the flesh islandwide, is spirited too. “People have this vision of me as a conservative person, but I’m actually quite adventurous,” she says. And possessed of a sharp sense of humor—when I compliment her cooking, Tsai looks at me with mock exasperation: “I have a Ph.D., you know.”
國民黨雖然還未正式提名總統候選人,但目前最被看好的就是立法院副院長洪秀柱。因為身材嬌小與好戰性格而被封為「小辣椒」的洪秀柱(67歲),如果獲黨的提名,將與擁有學者形象的蔡英文,呈現顯著的對比。洪秀柱向時代記者表示:「我不認為蔡英文是一位強的對手」。然而,民進黨的候選人已經士氣高昂,在全台各地展開競選活動。蔡英文說:「有些人認為我是一個保守的人,但我其實是很愛冒險的」。她有一種犀利的幽默感──當我讚美她的廚藝時,她用搞笑的語氣假裝惱怒說:「我可是擁有博士學位的。」
Tsai grew up in a home on Taipei’s Zhongshan Road North, a street named after Taiwan’s symbolic father, Sun Yat-sen, the Chinese revolutionary who helped overthrow the Qing and co-founded the KMT. Her own father, an auto mechanic turned property developer, was of the Confucian kind: he encouraged her to study hard but also expected her, as the youngest daughter, to devote herself to his care. “I was not considered a kid that would be successful in my career,” says Tsai.
蔡英文在台北的中山北路長大,這條街是以革命推翻清朝、成立國民黨並視為國父的孫逸仙命名。她的父親是一位修車技師,後來成為土地開發商。他承襲了儒家思想,希望蔡英文要用功讀書,但也期許身為小女兒的蔡英文可以留在父親身邊照顧他。蔡英文說:「我小時候不是一個被認為未來會有成就的孩子。」
After attending university in Taiwan, she studied law at Cornell in New York because, she says, it seemed the place for a young woman who “wanted to have a revolutionary life.” From there she went to the London School of Economics, where she earned her Ph.D., also in law, in less than three years. “That pleased my father,” she says. When he called her home, she obliged, returning to Taiwan to teach and, in 1994, to enter government in a series of high-profile but mostly policy-oriented roles in the Fair Trade Commission, National Security Council and Mainland Affairs Council.
在台灣大學畢業後,她前往紐約州康乃爾大學研讀法律,因為她說,這是一個「想過革命性的生活」的年輕女子該去的地方。之後,她前往倫敦政治經濟學院攻讀法學博士,並且三年不到就獲得學位。她說:「這讓我父親很高興」。她遵從父親的意思返回台灣,先回大學教書並在1994年進入政府,出任公平交易委員會、國安會及陸委會等一系列重要的、政策導向的職位。
Even close supporters say Tsai was, and perhaps still is, an unlikely politician, especially for the DPP. Taiwan’s opposition party was forged in struggle and led by veterans of the democracy movement—a fight Tsai mostly missed. The Kaohsiung Incident in 1979—a human-rights rally that was violently broken up by security forces, galvanizing the democracy movement—took place while Tsai was overseas, cocooned in the ivory tower. If the archetypal DPP operative is a bare-knuckle street fighter, Tsai is an Olympic fencer—restrained and precise.
就連許多親近蔡英文的支持者都認為,蔡英文是一位非典型的政治人物,特別就民進黨而言。身為在野黨的民進黨,在台灣民主運動的奮鬥過程中焠煉而成,由民主運動的老兵所成立,這是一場蔡英文錯過的戰役。1979年高雄的美麗島事件,當一場人權遊行遭警政單位暴力驅散,而後來激勵了台灣的民主運動,蔡英文當時正在國外求學,受到象牙塔的庇護。若說民進黨的典型人物是赤手空拳的街頭鬥士,蔡英文則是一位奧林匹克級的劍術家:自我克制又精確到位。
She stepped into the spotlight in 2008, becoming party chair when the DPP found itself booted from office, with its chief Chen Shui-bian, the outgoing President, later convicted of corruption. While she possessed a deep knowledge of policy, Tsai did not then seem like a leader. “She used to sort of hide behind me when we went door to door,” recalls legislator Hsiao Bi-khim, a longtime colleague and friend. “People compared her to a lost bunny in the forest, with wolves surrounding, both from within the party and outside.
在2008年民進黨失去政權,而前總統陳水扁隨即遭貪汙罪起訴的時刻,蔡英文踏入了鎂光燈下,成為民進黨主席。雖然蔡英文對於政策擁有深度的瞭解,但當時她還不像一位領導人。長期以來是她同事與朋友的立法委員蕭美琴說「以前當我們挨家挨戶去拜訪時,她有點會躲在我身後」。「有些形容她為一個在森林裡迷路的兔子,被黨內與黨外的狼群包圍。」
After an unsuccessful 2010 mayoral bid, Tsai ran for, and also lost, the presidency in 2012. Jason Liu, a veteran DPP speechwriter, says now that the campaign did not “sell” Tsai well enough. The ideas were strong, but the delivery left “distance between her and the voters.” Ironically, it was not until her concession speech that Tsai seemed to connect emotionally with Taiwan’s citizens. “You may cry,” she told the tearful crowd. “But don’t lose heart.”
2010年,蔡英文參與市長選舉失利,在2012年也沒順利當選總統。民進黨資深文膽劉建忻表示,當時的競選總部對於「行銷」蔡英文這個概念,做得不夠好;雖然擁有許多好點子,但是執行上還是「讓選民感到有所距離」。諷刺地,一直到敗選感言,蔡英文才似乎與台灣人民產生情感上的連結。她對含著淚水的群眾表示:「你可以哭泣,但不能洩氣。」
A lot has changed since 2012. Eleven hours after making eggs, with a policy meeting, a cross-country train ride and a harbor tour behind her, Tsai is addressing a couple hundred students at a university in the southern city of Kaohsiung, a DPP stronghold. She’s in lecture mode, at ease, talking about her party’s economic plans: stronger regional links and a focus on innovation to support small businesses. “How many of you went to Taipei for the Sunflower protests?” she asks in Mandarin. At least a third raise their hands.
2012年之後的台灣,歷經了許多改變。蔡英文煎蛋後的11個小時後,歷經了一場政策會議、搭乘高鐵從北一路向南、緊接著進行高雄碼頭導覽。她抵達南台灣民進黨的重鎮高雄,向數百位大學生發表演說。她以一派輕鬆的授課模式,闡述著民進黨的經濟計畫:加強區域間的連結,並聚焦於支持創新的小型經濟。她用中文詢問在場學生「你們之中有多少人去台北參加過太陽花學運?」現場至少有三分之一的學生舉起了手。
Taiwan’s students were once seen as apathetic. But during spring last year, Taipei was swept up by thousands-strong demonstrations over a services pact with China. Student and civic groups worried that the deal could hurt Taiwan’s economy and leave it vulnerable to pressure from Beijing. They felt it was pushed through without adequate public scrutiny. The Sunflower Movement, as it came to be called after a florist donated bundles of the blooms, grew into a grassroots revolt, culminating in the March 18 storming of the legislature.
台灣的學生過去一度被視為相當冷漠。但是在去年的春天,台北市被數以千計的抗議者淹沒,反對與中國簽訂的服務貿易協議。學生與公民團體擔憂這個協議會傷害台灣經濟,讓台灣的經濟受制於中國壓力而變得脆弱。他們也認為,服貿協議的推動並沒有經過適當的公民審議。太陽花運動是民間累積的抗爭與不滿,在3月18日這天一舉衝進立法院,運動的稱號是由於抗爭期間一位花販捐贈了大量太陽花而因此命名。
The movement was grounded in questions of social justice. Since coming to power in 2008, Ma has argued that cross-strait commerce is the key to the island’s fortunes, signing 21 trade deals. Yet young people in particular wonder if the deals benefit only Big Business on both sides of the strait. They say rapprochement with Beijing has left them none the richer, and agonize over the high cost of housing, flat wages and the possibility of local jobs going to China. A sign during a protest outside the Presidential Palace on March 30 last year captured the mood: “We don’t have another Taiwan to sell.”
這個運動的主要訴求就是社會正義。自從國民黨2008年執政以來,簽訂了21個兩岸貿易協定,馬英九主張兩岸的商業往來是台灣最關鍵的財富來源。但是年輕人質疑這項論述,他們認為這些貿易協議只有兩岸的大財團獲利。他們說北京的和解政策並沒有讓年輕人變得富有,反而讓他們受困於高房價、停滯的薪資、以及在地工作機會可能流失到中國的可能性。在去年3月30日於總統府外的抗議中,有個標語最能捕捉整體的社會氛圍:「台灣只有一個,賣了就沒了!」
The emphasis on quality of life, and not just macro-indicators, is good news for Tsai. Her vision for a more economically independent Taiwan did not sway the electorate in 2012 but may now have stronger appeal. The KMT, bruised by the Sunflower protests and then battered by fed-up voters in midterm polls last fall, is trying to remake itself as a more populist party. Timothy Yang, a former Foreign Minister who is now vice president of the National Policy Foundation, the KMT’s think tank, says the party stands by its cross-strait record. But even Yang, a KMT stalwart, is keen to address the issue of equity: “The benefits of this interaction with mainland China should be shared with the general public.”
台灣社會對於生活品質的重視,而非僅僅強調宏觀經濟指標,對蔡英文來說是件好事。她希望打造一個經濟上更加獨立的台灣,雖然這個理念在2012年並沒有說動選民,但,現在可能更有吸引力。國民黨在太陽花運動中受到重創,在去年秋天的期中選舉中又再度被選民以選票教訓。現在,國民黨試圖把自己再造成一個民粹的政黨。目前擔任國民黨智庫『國家政策基金會』副董事長的前外交部長楊進添先生受訪時說道,「國民黨堅持其兩岸的立場」。但即便像楊進添這樣堅定的國民黨員,也熱衷於解決公平的議題。他說:「兩岸互動的利益,應該要與全民共享!」
Tsai should easily carry traditional DPP support: much of the south, the youth vote, and those who identify as Taiwanese and who are not a part of the elite that came from China after the CCP victory in 1949. The DPP’s missing link is Big Business, which supports the KMT and closer ties with the mainland, where many Taiwan companies are invested. Tsai recognizes that this is a constituency she needs to woo but doesn’t seem clear as to how, beyond saying, “Our challenge is to produce something that is sensible to both sides without being considered as a traitor to the friends we used to be with when we were an opposition party.”
蔡英文要得到傳統民進黨的支持並不難,例如南部選民、年輕選票、還有那些認同自己是台灣人,而不是1949年中國共產黨勝利後來自中國的精英份子。然而,民進黨缺乏與大企業的連結,因為台灣企業大量投資大陸,而其中這些大財團多半支持國民黨,以及與大陸建立更緊密的關係。蔡英文也理解到這是她必須要去吸引的一群選民,但是對於如何進行並沒有太清楚的圖像。她說:「我們的挑戰是要去創造雙方都認為合理的立場,又不能被我們在野時的朋友認為是叛徒。」
That will be hard. The KMT has long argued that it, not the DPP, is best qualified to run the economy, which, corruption apart, did not do well under Chen. Tsai’s supporters concede that many citizens feel the same way—that the DPP can be an effective opposition but not administration. “The KMT has always portrayed itself as more suited to guide the economy,” says J. Michael Cole, a Taipei-based senior fellow with the University of Nottingham’s China Policy Institute and a senior officer at Tsai’s Thinking Taiwan Foundation. “There’s this stubborn perception that a DPP government would be bad for business.”
這是困難的挑戰。國民黨長期主張自己比民進黨更擅長治理經濟,尤其陳水扁執政時期除了貪污,經濟表現並不好。蔡英文的支持者也同意,確實有些民眾認為民進黨可是一個稱職的反對黨,但不是執政黨。諾丁漢大學中國政策研究中心資深研究員暨小英基金會資深主管寇謐將(J. Michael Cole)說:「國民黨把自己描繪是一個更適合主導經濟的政黨。另外也有一種僵化的刻版印象,認為民進黨執政對企業不利。」
It’s a narrative that the CCP backs and may well float as the campaign progresses, either directly, in China’s state-controlled press, or indirectly, through, for instance, its connections in Taiwan’s business community. “Beijing is going to want to make a point through all sorts of channels, including Big Business, that cross-strait relations will not be as smooth if you vote a government into power that has not accepted the foundation that has underpinned developments of the last eight years,” says Alan Romberg, a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center, a Washington, D.C., think tank.
這種論調受到中國共產黨的支持,並且今隨著選戰的進展不斷被拋出。共產黨可能直接地利用中國控制的媒體影響選舉,或是間接地透過中國與台灣商業界的連結。美國華府智庫史汀森研究中心(Stimson Center)資深學者容安瀾(Alan Romberg)說:「北京將會透過大企業等各種管道來闡述其立場,表明要是台灣人民讓一個不接受過去八年兩岸發展基礎的政府執政,兩岸關係的發展將不會如現在一樣平順。」
Beijing has never been receptive to a DPP government, but it is particularly negative now. Since coming to power in 2012, China’s leader Xi Jinping has proved himself to be more assertive and nationalistic than most expected, a man not eager to compromise. Last September he told a delegation from the island that China and Taiwan might be one day be reunited under Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” formula, which is rejected by both the KMT and DPP and, surveys consistently show, the vast majority of Taiwan’s people. This May, Xi warned again about the danger of “separatist forces”—a comment widely interpreted as a swipe at the DPP.
北京對於民進黨政權的接受度向來不高,但現在尤其抱持負面的態度。中國領導人習近平在2012年掌權後,證明自己比外界想像的還更加武斷,帶有更強烈的民族主義色彩,是一個不輕易妥協的人。去年九月,他對一個來自台灣的代表團說,中國和台灣可望採用香港「一國兩制」的模式統一,然而這卻是一個國民黨和民進黨都反對的方案,而且民調也一再顯示,絕大多數的台灣人民無法接受。今年五月,習近平再度警告「分裂主義勢力」會帶來的危險──這段說詞普遍被外界詮釋為對民進黨的抨擊。
Cross-strait relations are managed according to the so-called 1992 Consensus reached by Beijing and Taipei (then also governed by the KMT), a formula the KMT’s Yang calls “a masterpiece of ambiguity.” Under the 1992 Consensus, both sides acknowledge that there is only one China, but without specifying what exactly that means. This, Yang says, has allowed the KMT to move forward on bilateral trade, transport and tourism without being forced to address whether “one China” is the China imagined by Beijing or by Taipei.
兩岸關係是治理目前根據北京和台北(當時為國民黨執政)之間所謂的九二共識,這是一個被國民黨的楊進添形容為「模糊性的一大鉅作」的政策。根據九二共識,雙方承認只有一個中國,但不表明一個中國的確切意含。楊進添說,這讓國民黨在推展雙邊貿易、交通和觀光方面得以取得進展,而不需被迫去回答「一個中國」究竟是北京或是台北心目中的中國。
The DPP has long promoted de jure independence. The first clause in its charter calls for “the establishment of an independent sovereignty known as the Republic of Taiwan,” not the Republic of China, Taiwan’s official name. This platform resonates with the DPP base but is increasingly untenable given China’s economic clout and growing power on the world stage. While the first DPP presidency under Chen was hardly a break from the past, it did see a cooling with Beijing. Things warmed again under Ma. Lin, the Taiwan expert at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, says Tsai is somewhere between Chen and Ma: “If she wins the election, she will not pursue Taiwan independence. But she will not promote the development of the cross-strait relationship as Ma Ying-jeou did.”
民進黨過去長期以來推動台灣的法理獨立。民進黨黨綱第一條闡明「建立主權獨立自主的台灣共和國」,而非台灣的正式國號中華民國。這個立場獲得民進黨基本盤的認同,卻在中國的經濟實力成長與中國在世界舞台上崛起之下,越來越無法實現。儘管陳水扁主政時期的民進黨政府跟過去的政策並無太大差別,但跟北京的關係確實趨向冷淡。馬英九主政時期兩岸關係再度暖化。上海交通大學的台灣專家林岡說,蔡英文的立場介於馬英九和陳水扁之間。他說:「如果她勝選,她不會追求台灣獨立。但她也不會像馬英九一樣推動兩岸關係的發展。」
Tsai stresses that she will not alter the politics between Taiwan and China, but she is vague about whether she will repeal the DPP’s independence clause. And unification? That, she says, “is something you have to resolve democratically—it is a decision to be made by the people here.”
蔡英文強調她不會改變台灣和中國之間的政治關係,但對於是否撤回台獨條文卻是依然維持模糊。至於統一呢?她說:「那是必須經由民主程序解決的事情——這是一個必須經由此地的人民來做的決定。」
Hung, Tsai’s potential KMT opponent, says the DPP flag bearer needs to clarify her stance on cross-strait relations. “People ask her, ‘What is the status quo?’ and she can’t say anything specific,” says Hung. The KMT’s Yang offers a metaphor: “Before you harvest, you have to plow the land, transplant the seedlings, fertilize; all the work … has been done by the KMT, and yet they are going to harvest the crop?”
蔡英文的濳在對手洪秀柱說,民進黨的掌舵手需要清楚地闡明她對兩岸關係的立場。洪秀柱說:「大家問她『維持現狀是什麼意思?』,她卻沒有給具體的回應。」國民黨的楊進添用一個比喻:「在收割之前,要先耕地、播種、施肥;所有的工作……都已經被國民黨完成了,然而他們現在卻想要收割?」
Tsai believes she will win that right. Several days before I return to my Beijing base, over Taiwan-Japanese fusion in Kaohsiung, Tsai is quietly confident that she will gain the trust of Taiwan’s voters and secure victory, whatever Beijing might think. She puts a final piece of tuna on my plate. It’s from Pingtung County in the south, where she was born. “Go back to Beijing,” says Tsai, “and tell them you were served by the next President of Taiwan.”
—With reporting by Zoher Abdoolcarim, Gladys Tsai and Natalie Tso/Taipei
蔡英文相信她會贏得這項權利。在我返回北京駐點的前幾天,我們在一家位於高雄的台式日本料理小店用餐,蔡英文對於取得台灣選民的信任並贏得選戰,展現出低調的自信。當時,她把最後一片鮪魚夾到我的盤子上。那塊鮪魚來自南方的屏東,她的出生地。「妳回北京以後,告訴他們,」蔡英文說:「台灣的下一任總統曾經為妳服務過。」
延伸報導: Abdoolcarim, Gladys Tsai, Natalie Tso
2
bearer中文 在 立華 Youtube 的精選貼文
============================
BTSU資料手套更正
根據遊戲的英文版本"只需要手動摧毀任何蜂窩"就可以發動資料手套的天賦
而不是遊戲的中文版本"手動摧毀強心或巧匠蜂窩"才能發動資料手套的天賦
但容許我抱怨一句,到底是什麼人才會把天賦翻譯成與原文不符.....
============================
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bearer中文 在 Using OAuth 2.0 to Access Google APIs | Authorization 的解答
Note: Use of Google's implementation of OAuth 2.0 is governed by
the OAuth 2.0 Policies.
Google APIs use the
OAuth 2.0 protocol for authentication and authorization. Google supports common OAuth
2.0 scenarios such as those for web server, client-side, installed, and limited-input device
applications.
To begin, obtain OAuth 2.0 client credentials from the
Google API Console. Then your client application requests an
access token from the Google Authorization Server, extracts a token from the response, and
sends the token to the Google API that you want to access. For an interactive demonstration
of using OAuth 2.0 with Google (including the option to use your own client credentials),
experiment with the OAuth 2.0
Playground.
This page gives an overview of the OAuth 2.0 authorization scenarios that Google supports,
and provides links to more detailed content. For details about using OAuth 2.0 for
authentication, see OpenID Connect.
correct, we strongly encourage you to use OAuth 2.0 libraries when interacting with Google's
OAuth 2.0 endpoints. It is a best practice to use well-debugged code provided by others, and
it will help you protect yourself and your users. For more information, see
Client libraries. Basic steps
All applications follow a basic pattern when accessing a Google API using OAuth 2.0. At a
high level, you follow five steps:
Visit the
Google API Console to obtain OAuth 2.0 credentials such as a client
ID and client secret that are known to both Google and your application. The set of values
varies based on what type of application you are building. For example, a JavaScript
application does not require a secret, but a web server application does.
You must create an OAuth client appropriate for the platform on which your app will run,
for example:
For server-side or JavaScript web apps use
the "web" client type. Do not use this client type for any other application, such as
native or mobile apps.
For Android apps, use the
"Android" client type.
For iOS and macOS apps, use
the "iOS" client type.
For Universal Windows Platform
apps, use the "Universal Windows Platform" client type.
For limited
input devices, such as TV or embedded devices, use the "TVs and Limited Input
devices" client type.
For server-to-server
interactions, use service accounts.
Before your application can access private data using a Google API, it must obtain an
access token that grants access to that API. A single access token can grant varying degrees
of access to multiple APIs. A variable parameter called scope
controls the set
of resources and operations that an access token permits. During the access-token request,
your application sends one or more values in the scope
parameter.
There are several ways to make this request, and they vary based on the type of application
you are building. For example, a JavaScript application might request an access token using
a browser redirect to Google, while an application installed on a device that has no browser
uses web service requests.
Some requests require an authentication step where the user logs in with their Google
account. After logging in, the user is asked whether they are willing to grant one or more
permissions that your application is requesting. This process is called
user consent.
If the user grants at least one permission, the Google Authorization Server sends your
application an access token (or an authorization code that your application can use to
obtain an access token) and a list of scopes of access granted by that token. If the user
does not grant the permission, the server returns an error.
It is generally a best practice to request scopes incrementally, at the time access is required,
rather than up front. For example, an app that wants to support saving an event to a calendar
should not request Google Calendar access until the user presses the "Add to Calendar" button; see
Incremental authorization.
Compare the scopes included in the access token response to the scopes required to access
features and functionality of your application dependent upon access to a related Google
API. Disable any features of your app unable to function without access to the related
API.
The scope included in your request may not match the scope included in your response, even
if the user granted all requested scopes. Refer to the documentation for each Google API for
the scopes required for access. An API may map multiple scope string values to a single
scope of access, returning the same scope string for all values allowed in the request.
Example: the Google People API may return a scope of
https://www.googleapis.com/auth/contacts
when an app requested a user authorize
a scope of https://www.google.com/m8/feeds/
; the Google People API method
people.updateContact
requires a granted scope of https://www.googleapis.com/auth/contacts
.
After an application obtains an access token, it sends the token to a Google API in an
HTTP Authorization request header.
It is possible to send tokens as URI query-string parameters, but we don't recommend it,
because URI parameters can end up in log files that are not completely secure. Also, it is
good REST practice to avoid creating unnecessary URI parameter names.
Access tokens are valid only for the set of operations and resources described in the
scope
of the token request. For example, if an access token is issued for the
Google Calendar API, it does not grant access to the Google Contacts API. You can, however,
send that access token to the Google Calendar API multiple times for similar operations.
Access tokens have limited lifetimes. If your application needs access to a Google API
beyond the lifetime of a single access token, it can obtain a refresh token. A refresh
token allows your application to obtain new access tokens.
continue to use them as long as they remain valid. Limits apply to the number of refresh
tokens that are issued per client-user combination, and per user across all clients, and
these limits are different. If your application requests enough refresh tokens to go over
one of the limits, older refresh tokens stop working. Scenarios Web server applications
The Google OAuth 2.0 endpoint supports web server applications that use languages and
frameworks such as PHP, Java, Go, Python, Ruby, and ASP.NET.
The authorization sequence begins when your application redirects a browser to a Google
URL; the URL includes query parameters that indicate the type of access being requested.
Google handles the user authentication, session selection, and user consent. The result is
an authorization code, which the application can exchange for an access token and a refresh
token.
The application should store the refresh token for future use and use the access token to
access a Google API. Once the access token expires, the application uses the refresh token
to obtain a new one.
For details, see Using OAuth 2.0 for Web
Server Applications.
The Google OAuth 2.0 endpoint supports applications that are installed on devices such as
computers, mobile devices, and tablets. When you create a client ID through the
Google API Console,
specify that this is an Installed application, then select Android, Chrome app, iOS,
Universal Windows Platform (UWP), or Desktop app as the application type.
The process results in a client ID and, in some cases, a client secret, which you embed in
the source code of your application. (In this context, the client secret is obviously not
treated as a secret.)
The authorization sequence begins when your application redirects a browser to a Google
URL; the URL includes query parameters that indicate the type of access being requested.
Google handles the user authentication, session selection, and user consent. The result is
an authorization code, which the application can exchange for an access token and a refresh
token.
The application should store the refresh token for future use and use the access token to
access a Google API. Once the access token expires, the application uses the refresh token
to obtain a new one.
For details, see
Using OAuth 2.0 for Installed Applications.
The Google OAuth 2.0 endpoint supports JavaScript applications that run in a browser.
The authorization sequence begins when your application redirects a browser to a Google
URL; the URL includes query parameters that indicate the type of access being requested.
Google handles the user authentication, session selection, and user consent.
The result is an access token, which the client should validate before including it in a
Google API request. When the token expires, the application repeats the process.
For details, see Using
OAuth 2.0 for Client-side Applications.
The Google OAuth 2.0 endpoint supports applications that run on limited-input devices such
as game consoles, video cameras, and printers.
The authorization sequence begins with the application making a web service request to a
Google URL for an authorization code. The response contains several parameters, including a
URL and a code that the application shows to the user.
The user obtains the URL and code from the device, then switches to a separate device or
computer with richer input capabilities. The user launches a browser, navigates to the
specified URL, logs in, and enters the code.
Meanwhile, the application polls a Google URL at a specified interval. After the user
approves access, the response from the Google server contains an access token and refresh
token. The application should store the refresh token for future use and use the access
token to access a Google API. Once the access token expires, the application uses the
refresh token to obtain a new one.
For details, see Using OAuth 2.0
for Devices.
Google APIs such as the Prediction API and Google Cloud Storage can act on behalf of your
application without accessing user information. In these situations your application needs
to prove its own identity to the API, but no user consent is necessary. Similarly, in
enterprise scenarios, your application can request delegated access to some resources.
For these types of server-to-server interactions you need a service account, which
is an account that belongs to your application instead of to an individual end-user. Your
application calls Google APIs on behalf of the service account, and user consent is not
required. (In non-service-account scenarios, your application calls Google APIs on behalf of
end-users, and user consent is sometimes required.)
create and cryptographically sign JSON Web Tokens (JWTs). We strongly encourage you to use a
library to perform these tasks. If you write this code without using a library that
abstracts token creation and signing, you might make errors that would have a severe impact
on the security of your application. For a list of libraries that support this scenario, see
the service-account
documentation.
A service account's credentials, which you obtain from the
Google API Console, include a generated email address that is unique,
a client ID, and at least one public/private key pair. You use the client ID and one private
key to create a signed JWT and construct an access-token request in the appropriate format.
Your application then sends the token request to the Google OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server,
which returns an access token. The application uses the token to access a Google API. When
the token expires, the application repeats the process.
For details, see the
service-account documentation.
applications that run from a Google Workspace domain, service accounts are not members of
your Google Workspace account and aren’t subject to domain policies set by Google Workspace
administrators. For example, a policy set in the Google Workspace admin console to restrict
the ability of Google Workspace end users to share documents outside of the domain would not
apply to service accounts. Token size
Tokens can vary in size, up to the following limits:
Authorization codes: 256 bytes
Access tokens: 2048 bytes
Refresh tokens: 512 bytes
Access tokens returned by Google Cloud's
Security Token Service API
are structured similarly to Google API OAuth 2.0 access tokens but have different token size
limits. For details, see the
API documentation.
Google reserves the right to change token size within these limits, and your application
must support variable token sizes accordingly.
You must write your code to anticipate the possibility that a granted refresh token might
no longer work. A refresh token might stop working for one of these reasons:
The user has
revoked your app's access.
The refresh token has not been used for six months.
The user changed passwords and the refresh token contains Gmail scopes.
The user account has exceeded a maximum number of granted (live) refresh tokens.
If an admin
set any of the services requested in your app's scopes to Restricted (the error
is
admin_policy_enforced
).For Google Cloud Platform APIs - the session length set by the admin
could have been exceeded.
A Google Cloud Platform project with an OAuth consent screen configured for an external
user type and a publishing status of "Testing" is issued a refresh token expiring in
7 days, unless the only OAuth scopes requested are a subset of name, email address, and
user profile (through the
scopes, or their
userinfo.email, userinfo.profile, openid
OpenID Connect equivalents).
There is currently a limit of 100 refresh tokens per Google Account per OAuth 2.0 client ID.
If the limit is reached, creating a new refresh token automatically invalidates the oldest
refresh token without warning. This limit does not apply to
service accounts.
There is also a larger limit on the total number of refresh tokens a user account or
service account can have across all clients. Most normal users won't exceed this limit but a
developer's account used to test an implementation might.
If you need to authorize multiple programs, machines, or devices, one workaround is to
limit the number of clients that you authorize per Google Account to 15 or 20. If you are a
Google Workspace admin,
you can create additional users with administrative privileges and use them to authorize
some of the clients.
Dealing with session control policies for Google Cloud Platform (GCP) organizations
Administrators of GCP organizations might require frequent reauthentication of users while
they access GCP resources, using the
Google Cloud session control
feature. This policy impacts access to Google Cloud Console, the
Google Cloud SDK (also known as the gcloud
CLI), and any third party OAuth application that requires the Cloud Platform scope. If a
user has a session control policy in place then on the expiry of the session duration, your
API calls will error out similar to what would happen if the refresh token was revoked - the
call will fail with an error type invalid_grant
; the error_subtype
field can be used to distinguish between a revoked token and a failure due to a session
control policy (for example, "error_subtype": "invalid_rapt"
). As session
durations can be very limited (between 1 hour to 24 hours), this scenario must be handled
gracefully by restarting an auth session.
Equally, you must not use, or encourage the use of, user credentials for server to server
deployment. If user credentials are deployed on a server for long running jobs or operations
and a customer applies session control policies on such users, the server application will
fail as there will be no way to re-authenticate the user when the session duration expires.
For more information on how to help your customers deploy this feature, refer to this
admin-focussed help article.
The following client libraries integrate with popular frameworks, which makes implementing
OAuth 2.0 simpler. More features will be added to the libraries over time.
Google API Client Library for Java
Google API Client Library for Python
Google API Client Library for Go
Google API Client Library for .NET
Google API Client Library for Ruby
Google API Client Library for PHP
Google API Client Library for JavaScript
GTMAppAuth - OAuth Client Library for Mac and iOS
... <看更多>
bearer中文 在 Access Token Guide - Facebook Login - Meta for Developers 的解答
... Français (France), Italiano, Português (Brasil), Tiếng Việt, Русский, العربية, ภาษาไทย, 한국어, 中文(香港), 中文(台灣), 中文(简体), 日本語. English (US) ... <看更多>
bearer中文 在 [Day-35] 使用JWT來存取API內容(總結) - iT 邦幫忙 的解答
了解JWT 和Bearer Token 的關係與OAuth 2.0 · 了解HTTP Authentication 中有哪些schemes · 客戶端向後端出示API Token的三種方式 · Authenticate 的API Error 錯誤訊息 ... ... <看更多>